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Markus HINTERLEITNER and Fritz SAGER 
 
 
The lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must 
therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves. 
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince 
 
Abstract 
Blame Avoidance Behavior (BAB) encompasses all kinds of integrity-protecting activities by 
officeholders in the face of potentially blame-attracting events. Although considered essential 
for a realistic understanding of politics and policymaking, a general understanding of this multi-
faceted behavioral phenomenon and its implications has been lacking to date. We argue that 
this is due to the lack of careful conceptualization of various forms of BAB. Crucially, the 
difference between anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB is largely neglected in the literature. 
This paper links anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB as two consecutive decision situations. 
It exposes dependence relationships between the situations that trigger BAB, the rationalities at 
work, the resources and strategies applied by blame-avoiding actors, and the various 
consequences thereof. The paper concludes that anticipatory and reactive BAB are distinct 
phenomena that require specific research approaches to assess their relevance for the workings 
of polities. 
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Introduction 
Blame Avoidance Behavior (BAB) encompasses all kinds of integrity-protecting activities by 
officeholders in the face of potentially blame-attracting events. It is increasingly common for 
scholars to scrutinize political decisions and their effects in order to establish whether, and to 
what degree, they have been caused by officeholders’ motivation to avoid blame. By now, BAB 
is considered a widespread phenomenon that is essential for a realistic understanding of the 
nature and workings of political systems.  
Heightened interest in the phenomenon of BAB and its implications across different fields of 
political science has also made the concept of blame avoidance increasingly fuzzy (König and 
Wenzelburger, 2014) and has produced a scattered and diffuse literature (Hood, 2011). One of 
the major complications in the study of BAB is that different schools associate different 
phenomena with the term ‘blame avoidance’ and, consequently, study aspects that are only 
partly related when addressing this type of elite behavior and the consequences thereof. We 
argue that this is due to the lack of careful conceptualization of various forms of BAB. 
Crucially, the literature does not distinguish between BAB in anticipation of a blameworthy 
event and BAB as a reaction to a blameworthy event (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Hood, 2005). 
While anticipatory BAB aims at keeping a potentially blameworthy event off the agenda and at 
preparing for blameworthy events, reactive BAB is about the public confrontation of blame. 
This strongly mimics Machiavelli’s distinction in the opening quote where anticipatory BAB 
covers the fox’s mission not to get caught and reactive BAB embodies the lion’s resolution to 
defeat adversaries. Although this distinction is crucial for a general understanding of BAB, it is 
still underdeveloped and remains largely neglected in the literature.  
Starting from this insight, we conceptualize anticipatory and reactive BAB as two consecutive 
decision situations that officeholders face at various times throughout their careers. This 
conceptual distinction contributes to the literature on blame avoidance in three ways. First, it 
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allows for the conceptual exploration and systematization of the different starting situations that 
trigger anticipatory and reactive BAB, the rationalities at work, the specific resources and 
strategies applied by blame-avoiding actors, and the different consequences that are produced 
by anticipatory and reactive BAB (Johnson, 2014). Second, the distinction shows that scholars, 
when studying blame avoidance, essentially deal with two different phenomena that require 
distinct theoretical and empirical approaches for assessing their importance for the nature and 
workings of political systems. Finally, the distinction reveals starting points for empirical 
inquiry. Specifically, it holds implications for the existence of institutionalized blame avoidance 
arrangements across policymaking environments and the course of publicly visible blame 
games1 in different institutional environments and problem contexts. Taken together, this 
should enhance the empirical performance of the study of BAB.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we briefly delineate the behavioral tenets 
on which the study of BAB is based, outline the two main areas of research where BAB has 
been studied – comparative welfare state research and public policy/administration research – 
and associate these with anticipatory and reactive BAB. The main section of the paper models 
anticipatory and reactive BAB as consecutive decision situations and illustrates which resources 
and strategies actors apply when resorting to these types of behavior. In the final section, the 
differences between these two types of BAB are explicated and the implications for future 
research on this phenomenon formulated.  
 
                                                          
1 The term blame game, as used in this article, does not necessarily imply a game theoretic 
foundation. Instead, it broadly refers to social interactions between at least two sets of actors, 
namely “blame makers (those who do the blaming) and blame takers (those who are on the 
receiving end)” (Hood, 2011, p. 7). 
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Four Worlds of Blame Avoidance 
BAB is generally explained with the motivation of officeholders to avoid losses that can result 
from blame (Weaver, 1986). For officeholders, losses concern the goals that they strive for and 
aim to protect when pursuing a career in public service. Scholars have used different concepts 
to describe the goals of politicians and other types of officeholders. While some studies have 
modeled politicians as mere office-seekers or vote maximizers (Downs, 1957; Mayhew, 1974), 
others have acknowledged that politicians, besides seeking re-election, also wish to advance 
their political agendas (Strøm, 1990; Pierson, 1994). More recent studies stress that 
officeholders seek to increase their institutional power, protect their reputation, and build a 
political legacy (Béland, 2007; Moynihan, 2012). The important point is that for all these goals, 
blame is dangerous. Blame can hamper (re-) election and career advancement, destroy a 
reputation or a legacy, and prevent officeholders from pursuing their policy goals.  
When their goals are threatened by blame, officeholders usually prioritize their motivation to 
escape blame, since ‘blame avoiding behavior in situations that mandate such behavior is a 
precondition for pursuing other policy motivations in situations that do not compel that 
behavior. Those who fail to avoid blame are likely to find themselves unemployed’ (Weaver, 
1986, pp. 377–378, 1988). We can thus specify the behavioral preconditions that make 
officeholders engage in BAB: the inherent aversion to losses and goals threatened by blame. 
The reason why BAB occurs in a particular situation is an event or issue that appears on the 
political agenda2 and gives rise to blame directed at the actor. By shaking up the normal course 
of events, this ‘focusing event’ (Birkland, 1998) generates an action situation. Note that it is the 
                                                          
2 In the following, we conceptualize the political agenda primarily in contrast to the media 
agenda. An issue is on the political agenda when officeholders can no longer ignore public or 
media attention but must somehow position themselves with regard to the issue (Kingdon 
(1995); Walgrave and van Aelst (2006); Baumgartner and Jones (2010). 
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perceived, and not necessarily the actual threat, associated with an event that creates an action 
situation and entices officeholders to engage in BAB (Wenzelburger, 2011, 2014). For example, 
a government enjoying widespread electoral support or operating in an environment in which 
the attribution of responsibility is comparatively difficult can well implement an unpopular 
policy without ‘feeling threatened’ by that policy (König and Wenzelburger, 2014). Actors may 
not feel threatened by an event if they consider their electoral or institutional position to be very 
safe. 
While an explicit distinction between anticipatory and reactive BAB is absent in early work on 
the subject (Weaver 1986), scholars have subsequently acknowledged that the need to avoid 
blame does not only arise ex-post, i.e. after the event has occurred and provoked blame. Under 
particular circumstances, actors can also anticipate the blameworthiness of an event and try to 
prepare for it in order to protect their goals (Arnold, 1990; McGraw, 1991). When an issue 
enjoys intensified public attention for a while, when policies force responsible officeholders to 
take unpopular decisions, or when officeholders are appointed by their superiors to deal with 
difficult policy problems, they quickly realize that they have to work under dangerous 
conditions and that damage may be significant if something goes wrong. From this, Sulitzeanu-
Kenan and Hood (2005) have drawn the conclusion that one can differentiate between BAB in 
anticipation of a blameworthy event and BAB as a reaction to a blameworthy event. The authors 
stress that further research ‘is needed to study more particular relationships between 
anticipatory and reactive motivations and officeholders’ selection among [blame avoidance] 
strategies’ (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Hood, 2005, p. 19). Although this distinction is crucial for a 
thorough understanding of BAB and its implications, it remains largely neglected in the 
literature and, accordingly, its potential for the study of BAB has not yet been realized. 
To structure the diverse and growing body of literature on blame avoidance, two sensible 
distinctions can be made. First, one can differentiate between the two main areas of research 
where BAB has been studied – comparative welfare state research and public 
6 
 
policy/administration research (Hinterleitner, 2015), and then subdivide these strands of 
literature into work that studies anticipatory types and work that studies reactive types of BAB.  
Since the seminal work of Pierson (1994; 1996), the concept of blame avoidance has become 
well established in the literature on welfare state reform as a political strategy of imposing 
retrenchment against voter resistance. The conceptualization of BAB in this area of research 
draws on economic voting theory, which holds that politicians are held responsible at the ballot 
box by an electorate that retrospectively evaluates the economic performance of incumbents, 
following a simple reward-punishment logic (Fiorina, 1981; Arnold, 1990; Anderson, 2007). 
The causal chain linking the economic performance of politicians to voters’ evaluation of that 
performance comprises four steps: (1) policies are enacted by politicians; (2) voters evaluate 
policies for their economic implications; (3) voters assign responsibility for the policies they 
evaluate and (4) they vote accordingly. In this context, BAB is considered as a way to 
circumvent electoral punishment by influencing steps (2) and (3). Scholars have examined the 
use of blame avoidance strategies for retrenchment purposes in various settings and have 
explored the conditions under which officeholders can successfully apply such strategies (Vis, 
2009; Giger and Nelson, 2011; Wenzelburger, 2011; Mortensen, 2012; Jensen and Mortensen, 
2014; Wenzelburger, 2014; Vis, 2015; Hinterleitner et al., 2016; Sager and Hinterleitner, 2016).   
In public policy and administration research, BAB is treated in much broader terms and is 
considered a widespread phenomenon in the political sphere. Research has shown that there are 
many situations in which officeholders try to shield themselves from blame and that these are 
not limited to instances of retrenchment. BAB is studied in the policy process, in 
administrations and networks, after crises and failures as well as during the normal course of 
events (Bovens et al., 1999; Brändström and Kuipers, 2003; Hood, 2007; Boin et al., 2009; 
Hood et al., 2009; Hood, 2011; Moynihan, 2012; Mortensen, 2013b). 
Work on BAB in the welfare state domain deals mainly with anticipatory forms of BAB, since 
politicians need to envisage voters’ assessments of policies and design and frame the latter 
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accordingly. However, reactive strategies that actors apply when they need to justify unpopular 
policies have also been studied (Mortensen, 2012; Vis, 2015; Wenzelburger and Hörisch, 2015). 
Much research in the public policy and administration domain focuses on reactive BAB, where 
an issue has already made its way onto the agenda and the relating blame, for instance during a 
media ‘firestorm’ (Hood, 2011), has to be dealt with. Anticipatory forms of BAB have also 
been examined in the public policy and administration domain. For example, scholars have 
studied the role of different types of arms-lengths institutional bodies in insulating, blame-
deflecting institutional arrangements (Fiorina, 1982, p. 47, 1986; Horn, 1995). While Hood and 
Rothstein (2001) have examined blame-shifting organizational responses to demands for 
increased openness and transparency, Hood (2007, 2011) considered both anticipatory and 
reactive BAB in politics and organizational life. Table 1 provides an overview of the literature 
on BAB along the two dimensions outlined above. 
 
//Table 1 about here// 
 
Conceptualizing Blame Avoidance Behavior 
In the following, we build on existing work by conceptualizing anticipatory and reactive BAB 
as two distinct behavioral phenomena, exploring the dependence relationships between the 
events that trigger blame avoidance, the rationalities at work, the specific resources and 
strategies applied by blame-avoiding actors, and the different consequences produced by these 
types of blame avoidance. The conceptualization shows that both types of blame avoidance 
represent distinct behavioral phenomena that require specific research approaches to assess 
their relevance for the workings of polities. 
 
The Fox Game: Anticipatory Blame Avoidance 
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Anticipatory BAB in Machiavelli’s metaphor is about avoiding traps. Hence, anticipatory forms 
of blame avoidance aim at keeping a potentially blameworthy event off the agenda and at 
preparing for blameworthy events.  
 
//Figure 1 about here// 
 
As pictured in Figure 1, 𝐴𝐴 describes an event that can go either unnoticed (𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) or develop 
into a blameworthy event 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. Anticipatory BAB has two purposes: First, it is directed at 
decreasing the probability 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 so that a potentially blameworthy event does not appear on the 
political agenda and attract blame (with 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 1). To decrease 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, officeholders can 
make predominant use of what Hood (2011) has called policy strategies. Policy strategies are 
directed at minimizing individual liability by the careful selection and adaptation of operating 
routines and policies, such as the use of ‘indexing provisions’ that equip policies with 
discretion-limiting automatic adjustments for inflation (Weaver, 1988) or the formulation of 
policies with early-order benefits but widespread or postponed costs (Arnold, 1990). Lowering 
the visibility of retrenchment reforms serves the same purpose, since lower visibility decreases 
the probability that retrenchment will become politicized and thereby threatens the re-election 
prospects of politicians (Vis, 2015). In cases where the application of a controversial policy 
offers room for discretion, officeholders can try to decrease 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 by applying the policy in a 
stricter manner that pleases constituents. Moreover, politicians can try to reach deals behind 
closed doors to decrease the likelihood that a thorny issue makes it on the political agenda 
(Weaver, 2013). In Switzerland, for instance, where economic integration into the EU is a 
thorny topic, scholars have noted that international agreements increasingly happen behind 
closed doors and national laws and regulations are only indirectly adapted to the European 
context in order to avoid politicization (Jenni, 2015).  
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The second purpose of anticipatory BAB is to prepare for an eventual reactive blame game in 
case an event 𝐴𝐴, despite potential efforts to decrease 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, develops into a blameworthy event 
𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. Officeholders can apply agency strategies, which intend to shift responsibility or 
competency to others by means of delegation, diffusion or postponement, to place themselves 
in a better position for an eventual reactive blame game (Hood, 2011). For instance, 
officeholders can try to ‘pass the buck’ to not directly politically accountable bodies such as 
central banks, independent regulatory agencies or temporary commissions (Weaver, 2013). By 
delegating dicey policy decisions within an institution or shifting them to other institutional 
bodies, agencies, or contractors, officeholders can lower the probability of becoming associated 
with adverse outcomes when something goes wrong. A concrete example is officeholders 
responsible for the granting of early parole to potentially dangerous criminals, who frequently 
rely on expert commissions to back up decisions for which they bear political responsibility. 
When ‘circling the wagons’ by diffusing responsibility to as many policymakers as possible 
(Weaver, 1986), the amount of blame directed at one single actor can be lowered and more 
potential scapegoats become available during a reactive blame game. In short, agency strategies 
increase the future choice set of the responsible officeholder by widening the room in which 
blame can be deflected and diffused during an eventual reactive blame game. 
The applicability of certain agency and policy strategies, as well as their prospects of success, 
depends on the nature of event 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and the availability of specific resources. Not every event 
𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 necessarily allows the applicability of the full range of policy and agency strategies 
discussed above. For instance, particularly salient policies, which exist primarily as distant 
objectives for mass publics, “have the potential to elicit rapt attention and powerful emotion, 
but their design features and material effects slip easily from public view because they lack 
concrete presence in most people’s lives” (Soss and Schram, 2007, p. 122). Given an 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 of 
this sort, the effectiveness of policy and agency strategies that try to target these design features 
and material effects should be limited. Likewise, the visibility of particularly salient 
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retrenchment reforms is unlikely to be significantly lowered by the careful adaptation of policy 
aspects. In other instances, the policy demands of powerful interest groups may be so strong 
that officeholders cannot prioritize their standing with the electorate (Hacker and Pierson, 
2014).  
As far as resources are concerned, officeholders must have at their disposal information and 
formal authority to successfully apply agency and policy strategies. Substantial information 
about one’s responsibility sphere allows one to identify the events that contain considerable 
blame risks. Although this may be easy under particular circumstances, for example when an 
issue enjoys heightened public attention for a while, officeholders are often surprised by 
blameworthy events. And information alone does not suffice. Agency strategies aimed at 
shifting responsibility to others like ‘buck-passing’ or ‘blame-shifting’, or policy strategies 
aimed at modifying potentially blame-attracting aspects of policies can work only if actors 
possess the formal authority to do so. Sometimes, subordinates or officeholders working in 
adjacent policy areas may try to oppose the delegation or reshuffling of responsibilities (Hood, 
2002). Hence, there may well be situations where officeholders are perfectly aware of a 
potentially blame-attracting event in their responsibility sphere, but do not have the formal 
authority to work on agency or policy dimensions and overcome the resistance of other actors.  
When a potentially blameworthy event 𝐴𝐴 has been identified and resources to prepare for it are 
available, officeholders have to decide how much of their anticipatory resources they will use 
to try to prevent exactly this event from developing into a blameworthy one. Although not all 
of the resources are exhausted when deployed for event 𝐴𝐴, most of them cannot be used ad 
infinitum. Delegation arrangements, for example, can only be used sparsely, because not every 
task can be delegated away. Consequently, officeholders must carefully reason which events 
contain substantial blame risk and will concentrate the bigger share of their anticipatory 
resources on these events. The blame risk of an issue is primarily determined by the anticipated 
reactions of political and media elites and the public in case an issue makes it onto the political 
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agenda. The stronger the expected feedback effect from the mass public, the more political and 
media elites will invest to exploit the issue and blame the responsible officeholder (Soss and 
Schram, 2007).  
However, officeholders face a trade-off in that most anticipatory forms of BAB also come with 
forgone possibilities to claim credit when events go in a positive direction. Successful actions 
or decisions that were made less visible or delegated away are a forgone credit claiming 
opportunity, leading to a gradual erosion of political capital. For instance, when retrenchment 
reforms are appreciated (or at least accepted) by the electorate, lower visibility of these reforms 
limits the possibility of the actor to present herself as a decisive reformer. The degree of 
negativity bias in a given policy sector is thus liable to influence the individual investment in 
anticipatory BAB. The more politically charged and crisis prone a policy sector is, i.e. in ‘high-
blame conditions’ (Hood, 2011), the more resources the officeholder will invest in blame 
avoidance, and accordingly, the more blame avoidance arrangements such as delegation 
arrangements and public private partnerships should be in place. In other words, in a 
comparatively risky policymaking environment, officeholders should generally be more 
concerned with avoiding blame than with claiming credit (Nielsen and Baekgaard, 2015). 
Scholars should thus be able to find more institutionalized blame-diffusing policymaking 
arrangements in these environments, such as indexing provisions, independent regulatory 
bodies or ‘fuzzy governance structures’ (Bache et al., 2015). 
 
The Lion Game: Reactive Blame Avoidance 
Reactive BAB in Machiavelli’s terms is about frightening away wolves. Although reactive 
BAB does not necessarily encompass a resolute reaction by a blamed officeholder, 
Machiavelli’s metaphor nevertheless points to the fact that reactive BAB is not any more about 
recognizing dangerous situations, but about the publicly visible confrontation of blame. 
Reactive BAB is displayed only if 𝐴𝐴 → 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, i.e. when – despite potential anticipatory blame-
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avoiding efforts – event 𝐴𝐴 develops into a publicly visible blameworthy event 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.3 Given this 
new situation, reactive BAB aims at winning the blame game by increasing the probability 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 
with which event 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 develops into an event 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁 (no consequences), or in case the blame game 
is lost, tries to limit adverse political consequences such as resignation, demotion, or the loss of 
reputation (with 𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶 + 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 = 1; see Figure 1). In contrast to anticipatory blame games that occur 
on the quiet before the politicization of an event, reactive blame games are characterized by 
their public visibility. Depending on the nature of 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, different actors are brought onto the 
scene and form the actor constellation of the reactive blame game. 
The concept of ‘arenas’ is useful when structuring the relevant forms of interaction through 
which blamed actors need to ‘forge pathways’ to avoid blame during reactive blame games 
(Boin et al., 2010). The distinction between arenas provides important information about what 
types of actors are involved and in what environment interaction occurs. For instance, a blamed 
minister can be called to defend himself in a public inquiry, in parliament, or in the media. In 
each of these arenas, the minister faces different actors with different goals, different degrees 
of involvement, and different resources. 
For the sake of illustration, we assume a conflict between one blame-avoiding actor (Actor 1; 
e.g. a politician blamed for a policy failure) and one adversary (Actor 2; e.g. the parliamentary 
opposition modeled as a corporate actor) in an arena (e.g. in parliament). Figure 2 pictures a 
schematic reactive blame game. 
 
//Figure 2 about here// 
                                                          
3 Although reactive blame games can start without a preceding anticipatory blame game, taking 
a blamed actor by surprise, both types of blame games can be modeled as consecutive games 
for two reasons: First, the goal of the anticipatory blame game is to avoid a reactive blame 
game. Second, anticipatory blame avoidance can enhance the chances of prevailing in a reactive 
blame game. 
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In contrast to the anticipatory blame game, the blamed politician will direct full attention to and 
invest all available resources to avoid 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 developing into 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 , especially when the expected 
costs associated with 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶  are serious (significant reputational damage, potential loss of career, 
etc.). There is thus no trade-off like in the anticipatory blame game. During reactive blame 
games, blamed actors mainly have to rely on different types of blame management strategies 
(Bovens et al., 1999; Brändström et al., 2008). Agency and policy strategies are less useful 
during reactive blame games, since they usually cannot be put in place on an ad hoc basis, or at 
least lack credibility if implemented swiftly. An important type of blame management strategies 
are presentational strategies (Hood, 2011), which intend to shape public impressions and frame 
the public debate about 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. The literature contains detailed descriptions and categorizations 
of presentational strategies that actors can apply during reactive blame games, ranging from 
justification (McGraw, 1991; Green-Pedersen, 2002), discourse (Schmidt, 2001), rhetoric (Cox, 
2001) and framing (Ross, 2000; Druckman, 2001; Boin et al., 2009), to persuasion and priming 
(see König and Wenzelburger 2014 for an overview). Moreover, blamed actors can try to 
demonstrate commitment by launching inquiries (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010) or propose 
symbolic reforms to resolve 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and tackle its consequences (Brändström, 2015). The strategic 
demotion of subordinate officials can also be used to stymie adversaries (Brändström and 
Kuipers, 2003; Dewan and Dowding, 2005). 
The success of these strategies again depends on the disposability of several resources. As with 
the anticipatory blame game, information and institutional power play a crucial role. If actors 
enjoy particular advantages ‘when it comes to dispersing and withholding information’ 
(Brändström and Kuipers, 2003, p. 305), such as privileged access to the media, they can present 
events in a beneficial way. When they have the formal authority to launch inquiries or symbolic 
reforms, they can demonstrate commitment. For officeholders frequently exposed to public 
scrutiny, argumentative skills are particularly important. They help to shape public perceptions. 
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Another resource that allows officeholders to influence public perceptions in their favor is their 
prior popularity and the corresponding level of trust they enjoy. Both trust in government 
(Hood, 2011) and the popularity of specific (blamed) actors (Page et al., 1987) touch on the 
‘credibility of the source’ (Druckman, 2001), a concept widely used in the framing literature. 
To determine whether officeholders are trustworthy and possess knowledge of the subject 
matter, the public resorts to ‘source cues’, i.e. proxies that help to assess the credibility of the 
source (Mondak, 1993; Lyons and Jaeger, 2014). Both trust in government and the prior 
popularity of specific officeholders can be considered as source cues: A popular officeholder 
enjoys comparably more public confidence and credibility and should therefore be more 
successful at selling her frame to the public. Voters also tend to be more forgiving if a 
responsibility admission or an excuse comes from a popular and trusted actor. Another resource, 
useful for reactive BAB, results from group membership. Officeholders who can rely on support 
from their party or their head of government should be more successful during a reactive blame 
game. Blamed ministers, for instance, heavily depend on support from their head of 
government. If the latter decides to sacrifice the minister as a means of increasing government 
popularity (Dewan and Dowding, 2005), negative consequences can hardly be avoided. Finally, 
an important resource that enhances the applicability and success of blame management 
strategies are the blame avoidance efforts undertaken during a preceding anticipatory blame 
game. If the blamed Actor 1 has invested a considerable amount of resources in anticipatory 
blame avoidance arrangements before, he or she will now be in a better position to avoid blame. 
Anticipatory blame avoidance efforts widen the room for maneuver of the blamed actor by 
limiting the blame attributed to the actor and provide additional possibilities to displace or 
diffuse blame by increasing the number of available scapegoats (Bartling and Fischbacher, 
2012). Strategies such as responsibility denial are more effective if the blame-avoiding Actor 1 
can credibly point to other actors for the events at hand.  
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In the reactive blame game, Actor 2 (e.g. the parliamentary opposition) needs to decide how 
much of its resources, for example in the form of media access or time allotted for speaking in 
parliament, it devotes to blaming its adversary, while foregoing the possibility to emphasize 
own achievements. The amount of blame generated by Actor 2 is influenced by both the 
frequency of blameworthy events, and their timing. When blameworthy events are frequent, it 
makes sense to concentrate resources on just a few (especially promising) ones, so as not to 
wear out upsetting accusations.4 Moreover, when a blameworthy event unfolds shortly before 
an election, it is particularly promising to concentrate resources on this event, since it can be 
portrayed as a convincing reason for change (Boin et al., 2009).  
In order to fully conceptualize the reactive blame game, one must consider not only the 
resources and strategies of Actor 1 and Actor 2, but also the reaction of the public, since the 
reactive blame game, unlike the anticipatory blame game, is publicly visible. The reaction of 
the public can be captured by referring to the constitutive elements of blame. For blame to 
develop, two aspects need to come together: a perception of loss or harm and a perceived 
responsibility for the loss or harm (Hood, 2011). That is, only with a clear attribution of 
responsibility can a perception of loss or harm develop into target-oriented blame. Both 
elements of blame are influenced by a number of issue-related and country-specific contextual 
factors (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015). 
The perception of loss or harm depends on the nature of event 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and its salience. Salience is 
high when (policy) losses are concentrated and immediate, i.e. when event 𝐴𝐴 erupts into a 
dramatic focusing event 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (Jacobs and Weaver, 2014), or when core public values have been 
threatened (Brändström and Kuipers, 2003) and the social cleavages regarding these values are 
low (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Sheffer, 2011). The more salient an issue is to the wider public, the 
more interest and attention it will command, the more the media will report on it, the more 
                                                          
4 For instance, repeated demands to resign will lose their power when used excessively.  
16 
 
blamed actors will come under scrutiny, and the more likely it will be that specific interest 
groups mobilize resources to tackle the issue (Jacobs and Weaver, 2014). Another factor that 
influences the perception of loss is the type of media coverage 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 receives. Media systems 
that traditionally exhibit a more personalized and aggressive coverage style should very often 
inflate real losses. Perceived loss thus exerts a positive influence on the aggregate level of 
blame. 
The second aspect of blame, perceived responsibility, depends on the ease with which the wider 
public can see through the blame game and assign responsibility. This can be captured by 
determining the factors which influence the ‘clarity of responsibility’ both in the political 
system in which the blame game is played out and in the policy sector where 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 has emerged 
(Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2007). Relevant characteristics of the political system 
are the institutional fragmentation and the role and significance of parties. In more decentralized 
countries like the US, Germany or Switzerland more actors should be involved in the blame 
game than in more centralized countries like the UK, since subnational units possess more 
competencies in policymaking and implementation. Given that more actors from lower levels 
of government are involved, blame games should be situated further away ‘from the top’, with 
more wiggle room for top-level officeholders. This points to a more unclear actor set-up with 
multiple actors somehow involved in the blame game, spanning additional arenas such as 
federal parliaments or local media. Under these circumstances, responsibility can be more easily 
diffused and blame is more difficult to attribute to specific actors. In addition, in countries like 
the UK, Germany or Switzerland, where party discipline is higher than in countries like the US, 
responsible officeholders should be better insulated from blame since individual actors have 
fewer incentives to blame others and deviate from the party line in order to appeal to their 
voters. Instead, strong party images and party discipline should result in more government- and 
party-centered BAB, with individual actors being less directly exposed to blame (Weaver, 
1986).  
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With regard to the policy sector where 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 has emerged, the complexity of collaborative 
structures influence the ease with which blame can be pinned down. The more complex the 
structures around 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and the more actors involved, the more difficult it is to see through the 
blame game from outside. Complex structures should thus increase the room for maneuver of 
the blame-avoiding actor (Hood, 2011; Hobolt et al., 2013). Concrete examples where the 
responsibility-diffusing quality of complex collaborative structures becomes decisive are blame 
games triggered by delayed and expensive government projects. Such projects often encompass 
a considerable number of public and private actors somehow involved in the implementation 
process who shift blame around, making it difficult for observers to clearly assign 
responsibility. Another related factor that influences perceived responsibility is the degree of 
direct involvement of politically responsible officeholders. The more they are involved in 
specific policy issues, the higher the probability that ‘they are to be held liable for poor 
performance or for policy changes that impose losses’ (Weaver, 1986, p. 390), as they cannot 
easily distance themselves from detrimental outcomes (see Table 2 for an overview). 
 
//Table 2 about here// 
 
The aggregate level of blame directed at the blame-avoiding actor – buttressed and/or mitigated 
by contextual factors – exerts an additional influence on the blame game over and above the 
influence already characterized by the actors involved and their respective resources and 
strategies. The perceived loss of and the perceived responsibility for 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 predetermine the 
‘wiggle room’ of blame-avoiding actors in a particular arena, which they will try to exploit in 
the best possible way to avoid detrimental political consequences (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶). 
The assessment of resources and strategies applied by Actor 1 and Actor 2, and the reaction of 
the public, allow us to hypothesize whether ‘agency’ or ‘structure’ conditions will be more 
decisive for the course of the reactive blame game. By tendency, in settings where the perceived 
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loss is significant and/or the attribution of blame is easy to make, it should be more likely that 
blamed actors face adverse political consequences, regardless of their individual blame 
avoidance efforts. On the contrary, in settings where the salience of an issue is lower and/or the 
attribution of blame is more difficult, blamed actors should have more wiggle room and, 
accordingly, their individual actions and capabilities should be more decisive for the course of 
the reactive blame game. 
 
Implications for the Study of BAB 
Modeling anticipatory and reactive BAB as consecutive games emphasizes the dependence 
relationships between the different situations that trigger blame avoidance, the particular 
rationalities at work when blame avoidance is displayed, the specific resources and strategies 
applied by blame-avoiding actors, and the different consequences that are produced by these 
types of blame avoidance. This endeavor clearly shows that scholars, while drawing on 
common ground when studying anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB, nevertheless deal with 
two distinct behavioral phenomena that ought not to be conflated. Anticipatory and reactive 
BAB are based on different calculations, require different types of resources and strategies, 
display different dynamics and thus have different implications for our understanding of elite 
behavior. Moreover, both types of BAB face distinct theoretical and empirical challenges. 
Actor calculations. Anticipatory and reactive BAB are based on different calculations. While 
anticipatory BAB is based on the identification of potentially blameworthy events in one’s 
responsibility sphere and the careful allocation of resources to modify agency and policy 
dimensions, reactive BAB takes the form of an ‘all in’ game where blamed actors try everything 
in their power to protect their goals.  
Strategies. During anticipatory blame games, officeholders make predominant use of policy 
and agency strategies. Reactive BAB relies more on blame management strategies, since policy 
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and agency strategies usually cannot be put in place on an ad hoc basis and lack credibility if 
implemented swiftly.  
Resources. The relative importance of skills and resources to successfully avoid blame differs 
between an anticipatory and a reactive blame game. For anticipatory BAB, the capability to 
identify potentially threatening events in advance and the institutional power to modify agency 
and policy dimensions are most important. For reactive BAB, next to information and 
institutional power, argumentative skills and reputation to frame public opinion and blame-
insulating group membership are crucial. 
Dynamics. Both blame games have a different set-up and display distinct dynamics. 
Anticipatory blame games are much less visible and involve fewer interactive parts than 
reactive blame games, since responsible officeholders deal solely with the potential resistance 
to acts of diffusion and delegation. Reactive blame games, on the contrary, are more visible and 
interactive since various actors, ranging from political elites, media and interest groups, to the 
general public, are brought to the scene by a publicly visible, blame-generating issue.  
Relevance. Both types of blame avoidance have distinct implications for the understanding of 
elite behavior and its consequences for the nature and workings of political systems. The 
implications of anticipatory BAB are predominantly for institutional and policy design, since 
anticipatory BAB can translate into blame-deflecting institutional arrangements and policy 
design that may alter the institutional set-up of policy sectors and influence the effectiveness of 
policies. The implications of reactive BAB concern the understanding of how political systems 
handle blame in the political sphere, whether they can cope with it and fulfill their basic 
functions during blame games or whether reactive blame games lead to political polarization 
and policy stalemate. 
Theoretical and empirical challenges. Research on both types of BAB faces distinct theoretical 
and empirical challenges. Research on anticipatory BAB needs to establish when exactly and 
how often officeholders make anticipatory blame-avoidance calculations and whether, and 
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how, these calculations manifest themselves in policy aspects and institutional structures that 
can be utilized for blame avoidance purposes. While empirical findings suggest that public 
sector reforms can indeed lower blame attribution in the media (Mortensen, 2013a, 2013b), an 
important question remaining is the degree to which such reforms are actually driven by blame 
avoidance efforts in the first place. The conceptualization of the anticipatory blame game holds 
two important implications for this research problem. First, it reveals that blamed officeholders 
can rely both on fragmented structures deliberately created for the purpose of blame avoidance 
and on structures already in place. Second, the conceptualization suggests that blameworthy 
events do not occur or occur very rarely if anticipatory BAB is very effective. Thus, by testing 
the blame-deflecting and blame-decreasing effects of fragmented structures, we cannot answer 
the question as to how often officeholders ‘consciously set out to deploy the "problem of many 
hands" as a strategy for diluting their responsibility or distancing themselves from a knotty 
political dilemma’ (Bache et al., 2015, p. 84). The question as to how dominant the motivation 
of officeholders to avoid and prepare for blameworthy events actually is cannot be answered in 
this way, but must be targeted separately. 
Research on reactive BAB faces two specific research problems. First, it needs to establish 
whether and how the complex dynamics within blame games are influenced by country-specific 
and issue-related contextual factors. Without additionally considering the context in which 
BAB is displayed, it should be difficult to derive clear, evidence-based conclusions about its 
effects. The conceptualization of the reactive blame game suggests that both the perceived loss 
of and the perceived responsibility for an issue are buttressed or mitigated by contextual factors. 
Hence, the success of strategies working on these dimensions crucially depends on the specific 
configuration of contextual factors. Second, further research needs to assess whether, and how, 
reactive blame games translate into personal, political, and system change, i.e. whether they 
fulfill a spotlight function and open a window of opportunity or represent mere acts of political 
entertainment. 
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Empirical strategies. The specific challenges outlined above make it clear that both types of 
blame avoidance require distinct research strategies. Research on anticipatory BAB starts at a 
disadvantage, since anticipatory BAB is less visible and, thus, more difficult to observe than 
reactive BAB. Studies on reactive BAB can directly examine actor behavior, while work 
attempting to assess the importance of anticipatory forms of BAB needs to take a detour and 
infer BAB from other developments. To establish the causal relevance of anticipatory blame 
avoidance efforts for the institutional design of political systems and the design of policies, the 
conceptualization of the anticipatory blame game suggests that these efforts depend on the 
anticipated blame risk of events in the responsibility sphere of an actor. This insight discloses 
a way of measuring the pervasiveness of institutional arrangements associable to efforts of 
blame avoidance. While it is difficult to measure the development of blame avoidance 
arrangements over time (Hood, 2011), comparing them across sectors that vary in their blame 
risk offers possibilities to causally relate institutional and policy developments to efforts of 
blame avoidance and to measure the effects of anticipatory BAB on institutional and policy 
design. Another strategy is to process trace, backward, from institutional settings to those 
anticipatory blame avoidance efforts which created them in the first place (Pal and Weaver, 
2003). With regard to the study of reactive BAB, scholars need to assess the influence of 
contextual factors on various aspects of blame games – such as the actor constellation, the 
strategies applied or the degree of personalization. This can be done by comparing reactive 
blame games across political systems and problem contexts. Table 3 summarizes major 
differences between anticipatory and reactive BAB. 
 
//Table 3 about here// 
 
Conclusion 
It is increasingly common for scholars to associate various political developments with 
officeholders’ motivation and efforts to avoid blame. BAB is said to influence the nature and 
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workings of political systems in many ways. However, the concept of blame avoidance is often 
applied without giving full consideration to the overall picture. This article has shown that, 
when studying blame avoidance, scholars essentially deal with two different phenomena that 
have distinct implications for the understanding of elite behavior and require distinct research 
approaches to assess their overall relevance. To emphasize similarities and differences between 
these two types of BAB, the present article has conceptualized anticipatory and reactive BAB 
as consecutive decision situations that officeholders face at times throughout their careers. This 
has allowed us to explicate dependence relationships between the situations that trigger BAB, 
the rationalities at work, the resources and strategies applied by blame-avoiding actors, and the 
various consequences thereof. 
The conceptual distinction put forward in this paper has illuminated the specific empirical 
puzzles the study of BAB needs to solve. For the study of anticipatory forms of BAB, it is most 
important to find ways to establish whether, and to what degree, institutional arrangements that 
can be utilized for blame avoidance have been deliberately contrived for this purpose and to 
what degree the design and implementation of policies is influenced by anticipatory BAB. If 
so, the much debated declining responsiveness of political systems to various kinds of problems 
must also be discussed in the light of policymaking arrangements deliberately designed for 
reasons of blame avoidance (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013; Hood and Dixon, 2015). For the study 
of reactive forms of BAB, it is important to compare visible blame games across different 
institutional settings and problem contexts to establish how the ‘political treatment of failure’ 
within reactive blame games interferes with accountability mechanisms and influences policy 
and system change. 
In any case, a more careful and systematic look at the behavioral processes underlying different 
types of BAB should help to advance our understanding of ‘how political actors make decisions 
under risk’ (Mercer, 2005, p. 18). Conceptualizing anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB 
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constitutes an important step in creating a more realistic understanding of officeholders, their 
behavior, and the consequences this behavior may have. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Overview of the literature on BAB 
 Welfare State Research Public Policy and Administration Research 
A
nt
ic
ip
at
or
y 
BA
B 
- Anticipation of electoral punishment for 
retrenchment (Pierson, 1994, 1996) 
- BAB as a means of pursuing risky reforms (Vis, 
2015) 
- Arms-length institutional bodies that displace blame 
(Fiorina, 1982; Horn, 1995) 
- Indexing provisions that limit budgetary discretion 
(Weaver, 1988) 
- Opposition of policies that impose large and direct 
costs (Arnold, 1990) 
- Blame-decreasing organizational responses to 
demands for transparency (Hood and Rothstein, 2001) 
- Responsibility-blurring governance vacuums in 
multi-level systems (Bache et al., 2015) 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
BA
B 
- Justification for retrenchment and its effects 
(Mortensen, 2012; Wenzelburger and Hörisch, 
2015) 
- Blame-deflecting effects of political accounts 
(McGraw, 1991) 
- Cabinet officials as ‘lightning rods’ (Ellis, 1994) 
- Blame management after crisis situations (Bovens et 
al., 1999; Brändström and Kuipers, 2003; Brändström 
et al., 2008; Hood et al., 2009; Boin et al., 2010; 
Moynihan, 2012; Brändström, 2015) 
- Commissions of inquiry for blame avoidance reasons 
(Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010) 
- Blame attribution effects of public sector reforms 
(Mortensen, 2013b) 
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Table 2: Contextual factors influencing the clarity of responsibility 
Political System Characteristics Policy Sector Characteristics 
Institutional fragmentation Complexity of collaborative structures 
Role/significance of political parties Degree of involvement 
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Table 3: Differences between anticipatory and reactive blame avoidance 
 Anticipatory Blame Game Reactive Blame Game 
Actor calculations careful trade-off calculus; 
identification of potentially blame-
attracting events 
full attention (and resources) 
devoted to particular 
blameworthy event 
Strategies policy and agency strategies blame management strategies 
Resources information to identify potentially 
blameworthy events; institutional 
power to change agency and/or 
policy dimensions 
information and institutional 
power, argumentative skills, 
popularity and trust to frame 
debate; group membership; 
anticipatory blame avoidance 
efforts 
Dynamics invisible; less interactive (but 
potential opposition against policy 
and agency strategies) 
visible; more interactive since 
actors are attracted by 
blameworthy event 
Relevance impact of anticipatory BAB on 
institutional and policy design 
impact of reactive blame game 
on personal, policy, and 
system change 
Theoretical and empirical 
challenges 
when and how often calculation is 
made; when and how calculation 
guides behavior and translates into 
institutional and policy design 
influence of contextual factors 
on reactive blame games and 
resulting consequences 
Empirical strategies comparison of institutional blame-
avoidance arrangements across 
contexts; read back from 
institutional design to anticipatory 
BAB 
context-sensitive comparison 
of reactive blame games across 
political systems and problem 
contexts 
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Figure 1: Anticipatory and reactive blame avoidance 
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Figure 2: Set-up of the reactive blame game 
 
 
 
 
 
